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INSURANCE - LEGAL EXECUTION OF INSURED As A DEFENSE - Insured
was convicted of murder and legally executed by the state. Plaintiff is the beneficiary of his life insuran!=e policy. Held, no recovery on the ground that the risk
of legal execution was impliedly excepted in the policy as a matter of law.
Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Whitfield, (Ala. 1939) 190 So. 276.
Many life insurance policies contain no express exception of death by legal
execution. When the insured is executed and the policy silent on this point, the
decisions are in conflict as to whether the insurance company may prevail on
the defense of an impliedly excepted risk in a suit brought by the beneficiary
on his life insurance policy. The tendency of modern decisions is to allow recovery.1 This seems to be the better view. 2 However, a recent Massachusetts cases
and the principal case have held to the contrary. The formal reasoning of the
court in the principal case deserves particular scrutiny. The court first assumes
that a policy specifically insuring a life against the risk of legal execution would
be contrary to public policy. From this assumption it concludes that this risk
cannot be impliedly included in a general coverage. Thus the court reasons that
because the part alone is bad-i.e., that a policy of insurance insuring only
against death by legal execution would be contrary to public policy-that such
risk impliedly included in a larger coverage must likewise be held contrary to
public policy. This reasoning may well be questioned. First, no instance has been
found where a policy of the type first assumed by the courts has been issued.
At this point the validity of the first assumption and its applicability to the
decision in the instant case may be doubted as being unfounded in fact. Second,
it is submitted that in its reasoning the court has fallen into the part-whole fallacy,
in that different consideratio~s of public policy are involved when the express
risk of death by legal execution alone is insured against than when that risk is
only one of many included in a policy of general coverage. In I 898 the Supreme
Court of the United States applied the same type of reasoning UStJ by the Alabama court in refusing recovery in the Ritter case,' involving suicide of the insured. In I 902 it again denied recovery in the Burt case/ where insured was
For a collection of the latest cases, see a note in 35 M1cH. L. REv, 836 (1936).
VANCE," INSURANCE, § 229 (1930); R1cHARns, INSURANCE, 4th ed., § 370
(1932); 6 CooLEY, BRIEFS oN INSURANCE, 2d ed., 5222 (1928).
8 Millen v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., (Mass. 1938) 13 N. E. (2d)
950.
'Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 169 U. S. 139, 18 S. Ct. 300
(1898).
6 Burt v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 362, 23 S. Ct. 139 (1902).
The Burt case was followed in Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223
1.
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executed, upon the same type of reasoning, relying upon the analogy of the
suicide cases and citing the Ritter case as well as the English case of Amicable
Sociey v. Bolland,'-' which involved forfeiture of goods for conviction of a
crime. In I 920 the Supreme Court avoided the fallacy in the reasoning applied
in Ritter case and allowed recovery in two suicide cases,1 thus rejecting the same
type of reasoning employed by the Alabama court in the instant case. The Alabama cour~ emphasized one type of public policy-that of preventing insurance
against the risk of legal execution. It is submitted that countervailing policies
should also be considered. That a man should not be indemnified for the results
of his own criminal act is axiomatic in the common law. Thus an insured who
burns his own building to collect the insurance should not recover from the insurer
upon the theory of an implied exception. But if a third person should, without
collusion with the insured, ~urn the same building, there could be no objection
to the insured's recovering for his loss. It is apparent, then, that a policy may
2t times be unenforceable between two persons under one set of facts, but
enforceable between them under a different set of facts. Also, policy considerations may make a contract unenforceable between A and B, but that does not
necessarily mean that it cannot be enforced between A and C where the same
reasons for unenforceability are not present.8 In the life insurance cases, the
insured profits nothing from the results of his own insurance after he has been
executed. Further, there should be a public policy in seeing that dependents of
the executed criminal are cared for, not penalized because of his misdeeds. As
long as insurance rates are based upon deaths from all types of risks, and life
insurance is not generally considered to be a contract of indemnity, no advantage
is being taken of the insurer. Policy questions are always difficult of solution,
but courts should face them instead of applying mechani_cal methods of reasoning in the decision of cases.
G. Randall Price

U.S. 234, 32 S. Ct. 220 (1912), which is the latest Supreme Court decision on execution of the insured.
6 4 Bligh N. S. 194, 5 Eng. Rep. 70, z Dow.'& Cl. 1, 6 Eng. Rep. 630 (1830).
T Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 254 U. S. 96, 41 S. Ct. 47
(1920), discussed 30 YALE L. J. 401 (1921).
8 Levin, "The Varying Meaning and Legal Effect of the Word 'Void,'" 32 M1cH.
L. REV. 1088 (1934).

